Es geht für das Subjekt hier tatsächlich um nichts weniger als darum, auf seine Initiative als "Subjekt" zu verzichten.
[...]
Allerdings ist sie [die Disponibilität] ein prinzipienloses "Prinzip", denn die Disponibilität als ein Prinzip aufzustellen hiesse, ihr zu widersprechen.
[...]
Er [Konfuzius] ist so unnachgiebig wie die Unnachgiebigsten, wenn die Umstände es erfordern, so entgegenkommend wie die Entgegenkommendsten. Er ist dem einen Verhalten nicht mehr verpflichten als dem anderen, einzig der Moment ist entscheidend. Seine "Weisheit" ist ohne einen Inhalt, der sie im Voraus lenkte und festlegte, oder, anders gewendet, sie hat keinen anderen Inhalt als den, sich unaufhörlich erneuernd im richtigen Moment disponibel zu erweisen.
[...]
Die rechte Mitte dagegen heisst für jemanden, der sie in aller Strenge zu denken mag (wie Wang Fuzhi), das eine ebenso gut wie das ander machen zu können, d.h. zum einen wie zum anderen Extrem fähig zu sein. In diesem "Gleich" des gleichen Zugangs zum einen wie zum anderen liegt dieses "Mittel-feld" [mi-lieu].
[...]
Sobald man aber an einer Position festhält, gerinnt ein "Ich", ein Verhalten festigt sich um sich selbst rotierend, irgend ein Imperativ oder "Es muss" festigt sich, und man ist nicht mehr im Gleichklang.
in François Jullien – Vom Sein zum Leben, S. 30–36

   
Die Freiheit reklamiert für sich einen Bruch mit der Situation, in die sich das Ich verwickelt findet, und es ist erst diese Emanzipation, die das Ich auch zu einem "Subjekt" erhebt, das sich eine Initiative anmasst.
In François Jullien – Vom Sein zum Leben, S. 38

  last edited: Sun, 05 Jul 2020 01:57:52 +0200   
New York : Schocken Books, 1988, ©1966.

The insecurity of freedom (Book, 1988) [WorldCat.org]
Get this from a library! The insecurity of freedom. [Abraham Joshua Heschel]

   
Die Sprache oder 'das Wort' tyrannisiert Uns am ärgsten, weil sie ein ganzes Heer von fixen Ideen gegen Uns aufführt.
Quelle: Max Stirner – Der Einzige und sein Eigentum

   
Stuttgart Reclam [2016]
Reclams Universal-Bibliothek, Nr. 3057
Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (Book, 2016) [WorldCat.org]
Get this from a library! Der Einzige und sein Eigentum. [Max Stirner]

  last edited: Sun, 05 Jul 2020 01:12:12 +0200   
The original text treats also religion. Those text passages are left out here. The original text doesn't have highlighted passages.
[...]
Modern man continues to ponder: What will I get out of life? What escapes his attention is the fundamental, yet forgotten question, What will life get out of me?
Absorbed in the struggle for the emancipation of the individual we have concentrated our attention upon the idea of human rights and overlooked the importance of human obligations. More and more the sense of commitment, which is so essential a component of human existence, was lost in the melting pot of conceit and sophistication. Oblivious to the fact of his receiving infinitely more than he is able to return, man began to consider his self as the only end. Caring only for his needs rather than for his being needed, he is hardly able to realize that rights are anything more than legalized interests.
Needs are looked upon today as if they were holy, as if they contained the totality of existence. Needs are our gods, and we toil and spare no effort to gratify them. Suppression of a desire is considered a sacrilege that must inevitably avenge itself in the form of some mental disorder. We worship not one but a whole pantheon of needs and have come to look upon moral and spiritual norms as nothing but personal desires in disguise.
Specifically, need denotes the absence or shortage of something indispensable to the well-being of a person, evoking the urgent desire for satisfaction. The term “need” is generally used in two ways: one denoting the actual lack, an objective condition, and the other denoting the awareness of such a lack. It is in the second sense, in which need is synonymous with interest, namely “an unsatisfied capacity corresponding to an unrealized condition” that the term is used here.
Every human being is a cluster of needs, yet these needs are not the same in all men or unalterable in any one man. There is a fixed minimum of needs for all men, but no fixed maximum for any man. Unlike animals, man is the playground for the unpredictable emergence and multiplication of needs and interests, some of which are indigenous to his nature, while others are induced by advertisement, fashion, envy, or come about as miscarriages of authentic needs. We usually fail to discern between authentic and artificial needs and, misjudging a whim for an aspiration, we are thrown into ugly tension. Most obsessions are the perpetuation of such misjudgments. In fact, more people die in the epidemics of needs than in the epidemics of disease. To stem the expansion of man’s needs, which in turn is brought about by technological and social advancement, would mean to halt the stream on which civilization is riding. Yet the stream unchecked may sweep away civilization itself, since the pressure of needs turned into aggressive interests is the constant cause of wars, and increases in direct proportion to technological progress.
We cannot make our judgments, decisions, and directions for action dependent upon our needs. The fact is that man who has found out so much about so many things knows neither his own heart nor his own voice. Many of the interests and needs we cherish are imposed on us by the conventions of society; they are not indigenous to our essence. While some of them are necessities, others, as I pointed out before, are fictitious, and adopted as a result of convention, advertisement, or sheer envy.
The contemporary man believes he has found the philosopher’s stone in the concept of needs. But who knows his true needs? How are we going to discern authentic from fictitious needs, necessities from make-believes?
Having absorbed an enormous amount of needs and having been taught to cherish the high values, such as justice, liberty, faith, as private or national interests, we are beginning to wonder whether needs and interests should be relied upon. While it is true that there are interests which all men have in common, most of our private and national interests, as asserted in daily living, divide and antagonize rather than unite us.
Interest is a subjective, dividing principle. It is the excitement of feeling, accompanying special attention paid to some object. But do we pay sufficient attention to the demands of universal justice? In fact, the interest in universal welfare is usually blocked by the interest in personal welfare, particularly when it is to be achieved at the price of renouncing one’s vested interests. It is just because the power of interests is tyrannizing our lives, determining our views and actions, that we lose sight of the values that count most.
Short is the way from need to greed. Evil conditions make us seethe with evil needs, with mad dreams. Can we afford to pursue all our innate needs, even our will for power?
In the tragic confusion of interests, in which every one of us is caught, no distinction seems to be as indispensable as the distinction between right and wrong interests. Yet the concepts of right and wrong, to be standards in our dealing with interests, cannot themselves be interests. Determined as they are by temperament, bias, background, and environment of every individual and group, needs are our problems rather than our norms. They are in need of, rather than the origins of, standards.
He who sets out to employ the realities of life as means for satisfying his own desires will soon forfeit his freedom and be degraded to a mere tool. Acquiring things, he becomes enslaved to them; in subduing others, he loses his own soul. It is as if unchecked covetousness were double-faced; a sneer and subtle vengeance behind a captivating smile. We can ill afford to set up needs, an unknown, variable, vacillating, and eventually degrading factor, as a universal standard, as a supreme, abiding rule or pattern for living.
We feel jailed in the confinement of personal needs. The more we indulge in satisfactions, the deeper is our feeling of oppressiveness. To be an iconoclast of idolized needs, to defy our own immoral interests, though they seem to be vital and have long been cherished, we must be able to say No to ourselves in the name of a higher Yes. Yet our minds are late, slow, and erratic. What can give us the power to curb the deference to wrong needs, to detect spiritual fallacies, to ward off false ideals, and to wrestle with inattentiveness to the unseemly and holy?
This, indeed, is the purpose of our religious traditions: to keep alive the higher Yes as well as the power of man to say, “Here I am”; to teach our minds to understand the true demand and to teach our conscience to be present.
[...]
Yet freedom is not only the ability to choose and to act, but also the ability to will, to love.
[...]
We [the Jewish] are taught to prefer truth to security, to maintain loyalty even at the price of being in the minority. It is inner freedom that gives man the strength to forgo security, the courage to remain lonely in the multitude.
[...]
We all share a supreme devotion to the hard-won freedoms of the American people. Yet to be worthy of retaining our freedoms we must not lose our understanding of the essential nature of freedom. Freedom means more than mere emancipation. It is primarily freedom of conscience, bound up with inner allegiance. The danger begins when freedom is thought to consist in the fact that “I can act as I desire.” This definition not only overlooks the compulsions which often lie behind our desires; it reveals the tragic truth that freedom may develop within itself the seed of its own destruction. The will is not an ultimate and isolated entity, but determined by motives beyond its own control. To be what one wants to be is also not freedom, since the wishes of the ego are largely determined by external factors.
Freedom is not a principle of uncertainty, the ability to act without a motive. Such action would be chaotic and subrational, rather than free.
Although political and social freedom must include all this, even the freedom to err — its true essence is in man’s ability to surpass himself, even to act against his inclinations and in defiance of his own needs and desires, to sacrifice prejudice even if it hurts, to give up superstition even when it claims to be a doctrine.
Freedom is the liberation from the tyranny of the self-centered ego.
[...]
Although all men are potentially free, it is our sacred duty to safeguard all those political, social, and intellectual conditions which will enable every man to bring about the concrete actualization of freedom which is the essential prerequisite of creative achievement.
The shock of radical amazement, the humility born in awe and reverence, the austere discipline of unremitting inquiry and self-criticism are acts of liberating man from the routine way of looking only at those features of experience which are similar and regular, and opening his soul to the unique and transcendent. This sensivity to the novel and the unprecedented is the foundation of God-awareness and of the awareness of the preciousness of all beings. It leads from reflexive concern and the moral and spiritual isolation which is the result of egocentricity to a mode of responding to each new and unique experience in terms of broader considerations, wider interests, deeper appreciation and new, as yet unrealized values.
[...]
The meaning of freedom is not exhausted by deliberation, decision, and responsibility, although it must include all this. The meaning of freedom presupposes an openness to transcendence, and man has to be responsive before he can become responsible.
For freedom is not an empty concept. Man is free to be free; he is not free in choosing to be a slave; he is free in doing good; he is not free in doing evil. To choose evil is to fail to be free. In choosing evil he is not free but determined by forces which are extraneous to the spirit. Free is he who has decided to act in agreement with the spirit that goes beyond all necessities.
Freedom is a challenge and a burden against which man often rebels. He is ready to abandon it, since it is full of contradiction and continually under attack. Freedom can only endure as a vision, and loyalty to it is an act of faith.
There is no freedom without awe. We must cultivate many moments of silence to bring about one moment of expression. We must bear many burdens to have the strength to carry out one act of freedom.
Man’s true fulfillment cannot be reached by the isolated individual, and his true good depends on communion with, and participation in, that which transcends him. Each challenge from beyond the person is unique, and each response must be new and creative.
[...]
Refusal to delegate the power to make ultimate decisions to any human institution, derives its strength either from the awareness of one’s mysterious dignity or from the awareness of one’s ultimate responsibility. But that strength breaks down in the discovery that one is unable to make a significant choice. Progressive vulgarization of society may deprive man of his ability to appreciate the sublime burden of freedom. Like Esau he may be ready to sell his birthright for a pot of lentils.
A major root of freedom lies in the belief that man, every man, is too good to be the slave of another man.
[...]

Quelle: Abraham Heschel – The insecurity of freedom

   
Mit der Untersuchung von Florian Eitel widmet sich zum ersten Mal seit 40 Jahren eine historische Studie der einflussreichen anarchistischen Juraföderation. Bisher namenlose Mitglieder dieser Organisation treten aus dem Schatten bekannter Revolutionäre wie Michail Alexandrowitsch Bakunin und Pjotr Alexejewitsch Kropotkin. Die mikrohistorische Globalgeschichte analysiert, wie eine noch heute global aktive politische Bewegung entstand und funktionierte.
Die digitale Version steht auf unserer Cloud zur Verfügung: https://labonneheure.ch/cloud/philosophie/Literatur/deutsch/Eitel_Anarchistische_Uhrmacher_in_der_Schweiz.pdf
Sie ist gemäß https://www.transcript-verlag.de/978-3-8376-3931-5/anarchistische-uhrmacher-in-der-schweiz unter einer CC BY-NC-ND 4.0-Lizenz verfügbar.

   
Prousts erster Band des Werks "Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Zeit" steht in drei Sprachen als digitale Dateien auf unserer Cloud zur Verfügung.

Französisch (Teil 1.1)
Französisch (Teil 1.2)
Deutsch
Englisch

Für Prousts Werke gilt die Gemeinfreiheit (Die Regelschutzfrist beträgt in der Europäischen Union und der Schweiz 70 Jahre, in den USA 95 Jahre, beginnend mit dem Ablauf des Todesjahres des Urhebers).

  last edited: Sat, 26 Oct 2019 11:29:44 +0200   
[...] Car la confiance est bien ce qui, en dernier recours, une fous tous les arguments soupesés, fait basculer notre décision dans un sens ou dans l'autre et prote è trancher (« le ferai-je avec lui ou non ? ») ; de même qu'elle est ce dont procède l'assentiment qui seul peut générer positivement une communauté. La confiance est bien ce qui assure la cohésion et la viabilité du politique, mais sans être pour autant aliénante, en quoi elle se distingue de tout effet de charisme [...]
Or la confiance ne relève ni de l'entendement ni de la volonté : elle n'est de l'ordre ni d'une perspicacité de l'intelligence ni d'un « je veux » ; tout en dépendant de nous, elle échappe à notre maîtrise : il n'y a confiance que s'il y a déprise. Car elle relève non pas tant de sujet que de la situation engagée, non pas tant de l'individu que de la relation nouée, non pas tant de l'action que du déroulemend d'un procès. Dans la confiance, les deux partenaires sont également inpliqués et coresponsables : elle est, non pas de l'être, mais de l' « entre » – j'y reviendrai. Car elle n'est pas attribuable exclusivement à l'un des deux ; et même ne peut-on plus discerner, quand elle s'est ancrée, auquel des deux elle est due. En quoi elle relève effectivement, non plus d'une action transitive ou de l'initiative solitaire d'un sujet, mais d'une transformation silencieuse des conditions de consubjectivité engagées.
In François Jullien - De l'Être au Vivre, S. 45f.
[...]Letzten Endes ist es immer das Vertrauen, das unsere Entscheidung, nach Abwägung aller Argumente, in diese oder jene Richtung kippen und uns zu einem Urteil kommen lässt. Ihm entpringt auch die Zustimmung, aus der allein eine Gemeinschaft im positiven Sinn hervorgehen kann. Schliesslich ist es das Vertrauen, das eine Kohäsion und Gangbarkeit des Politischen gewährleistet, ohne jedoch zugleich entfremdend zu sein [...]
Nun ist das Vertrauen weder vom Verstand noch vom Willen abhängig, haben wir es nicht unter Kontrolle: Vertrauen gibt es nur bei gleichzeitigem Loslassen. Es hängt nicht so sehr vom Subjekt als vielmehr von der konkreten Situation ab, nicht so sehr von der jeweiligen Handlung als vom Ablauf des Prozesses. Im Vertrauen sind beide Partner eingebunden und mitverantwortlich: Es besteht im Bereich des "Zwischen" und nicht dem des Seins. Es kann nicht exklusiv einem von beiden zugeschrieben werden, ja man kann, wenn es sich gefestigt hat, gar nicht mehr sagen, wem es zu verdanken ist. Es ist etwas, das nicht mehr einer transitiven Handlung oder der einsamen Entscheidung eines Subjekts zuschreibbar ist, sondern einer stillen Verwandlung der Bedingungen der eingegangenen gemeinsamen Subjektivität [consubjectivité].
In François Jullien – Vom Sein zum Leben, S. 47f.

English translation:
In the end it's trust that lets our decision – after having consulted all arguments – pivot towards one or another direction and that lets us finalize a judgement. Trust is also the origin of any consent which can lead to a community in a positive sense. It's trust after all which ensures the cohesion and the practicability of the political, without being alienating at the same time [...]
Now trust is depending neither on reasoning nor on will – we cannot control it: Trust exists only in combination with simultaneous relinquishing. Trust depends much more on the concrete situation rather than on a subject, much more on the course of the process rather than on a respective action. In trust, both partners are bound and jointly responsible: Trust exists in the sphere of "in between" and not in the one of "being". Trust cannot be ascribed to exclusively one of the partners. More than that, after a trust has been consolidated, one cannot tell anymore due to whom it is. Trust is something which is neither ascribable to a transitive action nor to the lonely decision of a subject anymore, but it is ascribable rather more to a silent transition of the conditions of the entered joint subjectivity (consubjectivité).

  last edited: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 09:31:02 +0200   
Bei gemütlichem Beisammensein möchten wir immer am letzten Sonntag des Monats (mit Unterbrüchen, siehe Kalender) mit euch über ein bestimmtes Thema gemeinsam philosophieren. Das Thema geben wir jeweils frühzeitig auf dem Kanal bekannt. Die Teilnahme ist gratis. Freiwillige Beiträge sind willkommen.